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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 10-3-1012.5.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Respondents accept, for purposes of this review, Petitioner's statement of the issues.1
However, as discussed in the body of this brief, Petitioner has failed to properly preserve Issues
Four, Five and Six.
On Issue Number Four, Officer Lucas failed to make the requisite legal argument or an
offer of proof at the hearing to preserve this issue for appeal upon denial of his attempt to
introduce, for impeachment purposes, the tape recording of the polygraph examination of Martin
Spegar. Additionally, the Murray Civil Service Commission (the "Commission") believed that
Officer Lucas could and would avail himself of the alternative means of introducing that tape
recording. He failed to do so. These failures before the tribunal amount to a waiver of Issue
Number Four upon appeal.
Regarding Issue Number Five, Officer Lucas failed to object at the hearing to the
Commission's retention and use of independent legal counsel for the hearing. Failure to enter that
objection waived the Issue Number Five upon appeal.
Regarding Issue Number Six, Officer Lucas failed to plead and/or argue before the
Commission his allegation that Murray City failed to follow its own policies and procedures in the
internal affairs investigation. Failure to plead and argue this assertion waived Issue Number Six

1

Petitioner has failed to cite to the record to demonstrate that any of the issues identified by him were preserved before
the Commission as required by Rule 24(a)(5)(A), Utah Rules App. P., made applicable to this appeal by Rule 18, Utah R.
App. P.

1

upon appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for all issues before this Court is whether the Commission abused
its discretion or exceeded its authority. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (1991); Salt Lake City
Corp. v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Comm% 908 P.2d 871, 874 (Utah App. 1995). See,
Respondents' Point Number One for additional discussion of this issue.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutory provisions are determinative of the issues before this Court:
(1) Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 (1977, as amended 1991).
(2) Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (1991).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent accepts Petitioner's statement of the case as sufficient for purposes of this
appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts set forth by Petitioner are actually immaterial and should be
disregarded by this Court for purposes of this appeal: the second and third sentences of Number
1 and Numbers 3,4, 5, 9, and 10.
In addition to the facts set forth by Petitioner, the following facts are significant and
should be considered by this Court:
1. Officer Lucas made internally inconsistent statements and statements inconsistent with
other witnesses both during the internal affairs investigation and at the pre-termination hearing.
2. Officer Lucas was terminated for (1) untruthful statements made during the course of
2

the internal affairs investigation, and (2) untruthful statements made during his pre-termination
hearing. (R. 1). Officer Lucas was not terminated based upon his actions during the arrest and
processing of Martin Spegar or based upon any conclusions arising from the internal affairs
investigation of those circumstances.
3. On August 7,1996, Officer Lucas was afforded a pre-termination hearing on grounds
which included untruthfulness in the internal affairs investigation. (R. 365-382).
4. The Notice of Pre-termination Hearing was received by Officer Lucas in time for him
to review the allegations. (R. 365)
5. The Notice of Pre-termination Hearing identified, among other bases for the hearing,
the allegation of untruthfulness:
You violated the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics which calls for
honesty and integrity in all official acts. The acts of untruthfulness
occurred in denying events which occurred concerning a service
weapon after receiving the cautionary warning under Garrity.
(R. 364).
6. The Commission held a hearing on October 14,1996 to hear arguments and receive
evidence on the City's Motion in Limine to exclude evidence of a retaliatory motive in the
termination of Officer Lucas. (R. 232-282).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Scope Of Review By The Civil Service Commission And The Scope Of
Judicial Review In This Matter Is Much Narrower Than Urged By Petitioner

Officer Lucas was discharged on very narrow grounds: untruthfulness during an internal
affairs investigation and in a pre-termination hearing. The authority of and scope of the hearing
before the Civil Service Commission is strictly limited to only two issues: (1) whether the facts
3

support Chief Killian's conclusion that Officer Lucas was untruthful, and if so, (2) whether the
untruthfulness warranted discharge. The judicial review by this Court of the Commission's
decision is statutorily limited to a review of the record to determine whether the Commission
exceeded its authority or abused its discretion, and in making this determination, this Court should
afford the Commission considerable deference in matters within its discretion, i.e., those within
the Commission's authority. Nevertheless, Officer Lucas improperly attempted to treat the
hearing before the Civil Service Commission as a trial before a court of law with much broader
authority and jurisdiction than the Commission actually has. Additionally, Officer Lucas
improperly expects this Court to expand its review of the Commission's decision to include a de
novo review of the facts.
2.

The Commission Properly Excluded Evidence As To A Defense Of
Retaliatory Discharge In Its Evaluation Of Officer Lucas9 Termination

The authority of the Commission is very narrow as clearly defined by statute. The
Commission acted properly and within its jurisdiction when it disallowed any evidence of the
defense of retaliatory discharge. The Commission is not bound to conduct its proceedings
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Evidence, and even if it was, it properly excluded the defense of
retaliatory discharge because the evidence was irrelevant. Alternatively, even if the Commission
should have admitted the evidence of retaliatory discharge, Officer Lucas cannot show harmful
error.
3.

Sufficient Material Evidence Exists In The Record To Support The
Commission's Decision To Uphold Chief Killian's Conclusion That Lucas
Had Been Untruthful

There is sufficient evidence in the record before the Commission for a reasonable person

4

to conclude that Officer Lucas had been untruthful Officer Lucas' statements during the internal
affairs investigation and at the pre-termination hearing were both internally inconsistent and
inconsistent with other witnesses accounts.
4.

The Commission Properly Concluded That The Termination Of A Police
Officer Was An Appropriate Disciplinary Action For Untruthfulness

Because police officers are held to a higher standard of conduct and because the police
chief and the public at large must be able to depend on the fundamental trustworthiness of police
officers, the Chiefs termination of Officer Lucas for being untruthful is completely justified.
5.

The Commission Properly Excluded Mr. Spegar's Taped Polygraph
Examination And Even If The Evidence Should Have Been Admitted,
Failure To Do So Was Harmless Error

The Commission is not bound to follow the Rules of Evidence. Even if it were, the
Commission properly excluded the audio tape of Mr. Spegar's polygraph examination because
Officer Lucas failed to properly lay foundation for the admission of the evidence. Furthermore,
any error by the Commission in the exclusion of the evidence is harmless because the transcript of
the audio tape was entered into the record.
6.

The Commission Appropriately Retained And Utilized The Services Of
Independent Legal Counsel And Even If The Extent Of Counsel's
Involvement Were Inappropriate, There Is No Basis For Reversal Since The
Error Is Harmless

The Commission has the right to hire legal counsel to advise it on legal issues which are
outside the knowledge and expertise of laypersons sitting on the Commission. Even if the
Commission should not have utilized legal counsel in the proceedings, Officer Lucas failed to
properly object. Additionally, even if counsel for the Commission should not have been so
involved in the hearing, any error is harmless because any involvement by legal counsel for the
5

Commission did not affect the outcome of the hearing.
7.

The City's Failure To Comply With Its Rules Was Immaterial To The Basis
Of Officer Lucas' Termination And To The Commission's Affirmation Of
That Termination

Officer Lucas was not terminated as a result of specific findings made in an internal affairs
investigation. Instead, he was terminated for making untruthful statements to his superiors during
the internal affairs investigation and during his pre-termination hearing. Because Officer Lucas
was not terminated as a result of the internal affairs investigation, the City's failure to follow any
of its policies or procedural rules for internal affairs investigations is irrelevant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THIS MATTER IS MUCH
NARROWER THAN URGED BY PETITIONER
The Petitioner implies throughout his brief that both the Commission's authority and this
Court's standard of review are much broader than they actually are. The Commission, however,
had a very narrow role to perform in the review of Officer Lucas' termination and this Court has a
very narrow standard of review in the appeal of the Commission's decision.
The evaluation by the Commission was limited to two issues: (1) do the facts support the
Chief Killian's conclusion that Officer Lucas was being untruthful, and if so, (2) does the
untruthfulness warrant discharge? Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Comm Vz,
908 P.2d 871, 876 (Utah App. 1995) {citing In re Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356, 1361
(Utah 1986)). Any evidence not directly related to these two inquiries is immaterial to the issue
that was before the Commission.

6

Furthermore, the standard of review by this Court is limited to a determination of whether
the Commission (1) abused its discretion or (2) exceeded its authority. Salt Lake City Corp. at
874; Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (1991).
In addressing the issues asserted by Officer Lucas in this appeal, it is essential to keep
several fundamental facts in mind. First, Officer Lucas was not terminated for his behavior during
and related to the arrest and processing of Martin Spegar. Officer Lucas was terminated for
dishonesty. Specifically, the Chief of Police terminated Officer Lucas for making untruthful
statements in the course of an internal affairs investigation and subsequently during a pretermination hearing. (R. 1) The issue before the Commission was whether there was factual basis
for the allegation that Officer Lucas gave untruthful statements, not whether the internal affairs
investigation against Officer Lucas for his other conduct was or was not appropriately conducted.
A.

The Role Of The Commission Is Narrowly Limited To Either Affirming Or Denying
The Termination Of Officer Lucas
Murray City Police Department initiated an internal affairs investigation in order to review

Officer Lucas' conduct during a post-arrest search of Martin Spegar. Specifically, allegations
were made by members of the public indicating that Officer Lucas had improperly pulled his
weapon on Martin Spegar during the search that took place in an interrogation room at the
Murray City Police Department. During the internal affairs investigation, Officer Lucasfirstmade
an unequivocal denial that he had pulled his weapon. (R. 306). Then, after finding out that
another officer witnessed him with his weapon pulled, Officer Lucas changed his story and stated
that he didn't know whether he pulled his weapon or not. (R. 398). From that point on, Officer
Lucas continued to make inconsistent statements about whether or not his weapon was actually
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pulled (R. 366, 367, 375). The results of the internal affairs investigation proved to be
inconclusive, and Officer Lucas was not disciplined as a result of any action that was taken by him
during the search of Martin Spegar. However, Officer Lucas was terminated for making
untruthful statements to his superior officers during the internal affairs investigation and during his
pre-termination hearing. (R. 1). Officer Lucas appealed Chief Killian's decision to terminate him
to the Commission.
At the Commission's hearing, Officer Lucas continued to make inconsistent statements
regarding the events surrounding his search of Martin Spegar. Officer Lucas also attempted cloud
the focus of the Commission hearing and enter evidence on issues outside the scope of the
Commission's authority. Specifically, Officer Lucas wanted to introduce evidence of an alleged
retaliatory discharge which the Commission properly liminied out. (R. 162-163). See also
Respondent's argument on Point 2. Officer Lucas also argued at the hearing that he only had his
weapon at his side instead of pointed at Martin Spegar's head and that he did not intend to
deceive his superior officers with his statements. (R. 835-852). The problem with the majority of
Officer Lucas' evidence and argument at the Commission hearing is that those issues were
irrelevant to the Commission's determination. Any inquiry into whether or not Officer Lucas
actually pulled his weapon on Martin Spegar was immaterial to the Commission's determinations
because Officer Lucas' statements were internally inconsistent. Respondent points all of this out
because Petitioner has argued and continues to argue facts which were irrelevant to the
Commission's hearing and facts which are outside this Court's purview.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 (1977, as amended 1991) provides that a civil service
commission "fully hear and determine" issues related to a termination action taken by a
8

department head. As applied to the termination of a police officer, the Commission is restricted
to "a simple thumbs up or thumbs down on the Chiefs suspension and termination decisions."
Salt Lake City Corp. at 876. The Commission's inquiry is limited to determination of two issues:
"(1) do the facts support the charges made by the department head, and, if so, (2) do the charges
warrant the sanction imposed?" Id. citing In re Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Utah
1986).
The inquiry of the Commission was limited to a determination of (1) whether Officer
Lucas had been untruthful during the course of the internal affairs investigation and at the pretermination hearing and if so, (2) whether the termination of Officer Lucas was warranted under
the circumstances. Because the Commission answered "yes" to both of these questions, it
properly affirmed the termination of Officer Lucas. (R. 217-223,224-25).
B.

This Court's Standard Of Review On All Of Petitioner's Points Of Error Is An
Abuse Of Discretion Standard
Petitioner improperly argues that the standard of review on his Issues Numbers 1, 4, 5,

and 6 is a correction of error standard, giving no deference to the Commission's decision.
Petitioner's Brief, p. 2. The scope of review for all the issues raised in Petitioner's brief is an
abuse of discretion standard as set forth in the Civil Service Commission provisions of the Utah
Code, which provide in part:
The review by Court of Appeals shall be on the record of the
commission and shall be for the purpose of determining if the
commission has abused its discretion or exceeded its authority.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (1991).
This Court has discussed the "abuse of discretion" standard in the termination of a public
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employee setting in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Utah App. 1991).2
The Tolman court noted that there are judicial and statutory limits to discretion and defined
discretion as "an arena bounded by the law, within which the tribunal may exercise its judgment as
it sees fit." Tolman, at 26 (emphasis added). The court goes on to state that an abuse of
discretion is "a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment-one that is clearly against the logic
and the effect of such facts as are presented in support of the application or against the reasonable
and probable deductions to be drawnfromthe facts disclosed upon the hearing." Tolman, at 26
{citing State v. Draper, 27 P.2d 39, 49-50 (Utah 1933)).
If a decision by the Commission falls within its discretion, such as its findings of fact, the
appellate court reviews that determination under a "clearly erroneous standard, giving great
deference to the tribunal's findings." Tolman, at 27 (emphasis added). Only if the tribunal has
stepped outside its "arena of discretion," i.e., outside its authority, does the appellate court apply
a correction of error standard. Id. "In essence, a reviewing court never overturns a lower
tribunal unless there has been an abuse of discretion." Id. (emphasis added).
Clearly, as undisputed by Petitioner, Petitioner's issues 2 and 3 fall within the
Commission's discretion and are judged upon an abuse of discretion standard.
Similarly, all of the evidentiary rulings of the Commission and the decision by the Commission to
hire outside counsel fall squarely within the realm of its discretion. The standard of review for all
issues before this Court is an abuse of discretion standard with a great deal of deference allowed
to the Commission's decisions.

Tolman was before the Court of Appeals in a somewhat unusual posture, being an appeal from a district court's
review under Rule 65B, Utah R. Civ. P., of an administrative proceeding. The standard of review, however, is the same.
Tolman at 26.
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The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) does not apply to this action. Davis
County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 706 (Utah App. 1988) (act applies only to state and not
to local agencies); Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2(l)(b) ("agency" as covered by the act "does not
mean... any political subdivision of the state, or any administrative unit of a political subdivision
of the state.") As a result, any case law discussing standard of review of an agency covered by
the UAPA is not controlling in this matter. This Court must look only to statutory provisions
governing judicial review of a civil service commission review and case law related to review of
local government administrative decisions to determine the proper standard of review.3
Respondent argues this point because the task for this Court is much narrower than
implied by the issues presented by Officer Lucas. The Commission's inquiry was, consistent with
statute and case law, narrowly tailored to determining whether the facts supported Chief Killian's
conclusion that Officer Lucas had been untruthful and whether that untruthfulness justified his
termination. This Court's review of the Commissions conclusions is limited by statute to a
determinationfromthe record before the Commission whether the Commission abused its
discretion or exceeded its authority. Because the essential determinations by the Commission
clearly fall within its discretion, this Court must afford those determinations considerable
deference. Given the narrow scope of review by this Court, many of the arguments presented by
Officer Lucas fall outside the parameters of appropriate judicial review under § 10-3-1012.5 and
are immaterial to the issue of whether the Commission abused its discretion.

3

This point is made because many of the cases within the area of administrative law, including several cited by Officer
Lucas, explicitly or implicitly rely on UAPA provisions which are inconsistent with the common law related to administrative reviews, making them inapplicable to a review of the actions of the Commission.
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POINT II
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE AS TO A
DEFENSE OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE IN ITS EVALUATION OF
OFFICER LUCAS' TERMINATION
A.

The Jurisdiction Of The Commission Is Very Narrow And Does Not Include The
Authority To Evaluate Legal Defenses
The scope of the Civil Service Commission's authority is clearly and narrowly defined by

statute and case law to a determination of (1) whether facts exist to support the charges of
untruthfulness against Officer Lucas by the Chief of Police, Ken Killian, and if so, (2) whether the
termination of Officer Lucas was appropriate under the circumstances. Salt Lake City Corp., at
876 citing In re Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Utah 1986). If the Commission's
answer to either of these questions was no, the Commission was bound to reverse the termination
of Officer Lucas. See, Salt Lake City Corp., at 877.
Officer Lucas argues, in effect, that the Commission should function on the same level as a
court of law and widen the scope of its inquiry beyond its statutory authority
to include a hearing of the legal defense of retaliatory discharge. However, the Commission is
not a tribunal of general jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction is narrowly limited by statute and applicable
case law. It is permitted only to determine the sufficiency of the cause of removal, not any legal
defenses to the cause of removal. Salt Lake City Corp. at 876, citing Vetterli at 797. If the
Commission had widened the scope of inquiry in such a fashion, it would have been a clear abuse
of discretion and reversible error.

12

B.

The Commission Is Not Bound To Conduct Its Proceedings Pursuant To The Utah
Rules Of Evidence
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the significant differences between judicial and

administrative procedures and acknowledged that strict application of judicial procedures by an
administrative agency is inappropriate.
Administrative proceedings are usually conducted with greater
flexibility and informality than judicial proceedings. Rigid
adherence to judicial procedures in administrative proceedings is
generally inappropriate because it ignores basic differences between
judicial and administrative procedures.
Pilcher v. State Dept. of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted,
emphasis added). While Pilcher might arguably stand for the proposition that an agency that
adopts the Utah Rules of Evidence may be subject to those rules, it does not "bind" the
Commission to strictly apply those rules in this or any other case before it. For one thing, the
Pilcher dictum dealt expressly with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, not the rules of evidence.
A Commission can identify rules of civil procedure in advance and apply the rules uniformly to all
cases with little specialized training. By contrast, applications of the rules of evidence would
require specialized training and significant experience and often need to be decided with little or
no notice. For a variety of reasons, it is more difficult to restrict a civil service commission,
whose members are not legally trained, to strict application of the rules of evidence much like a
court of law.
The Commission, in its Rules and Regulations, has adopted the Utah Rules of Evidence
subject to discretionary application by the Commission.
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At all hearings, the Commission will determine the admissibility of
evidence and shall use as near as it deems practicable the rules of
evidence followed in the Courts of this State.
Rule 13-10 (emphasis added). The express language of the rule permits discretion by the
Commission in its application of the rules of evidence. Clearly, this does not amount to being
"bound to abide by the Utah Rules of Evidence" as argued by Officer Lucas. Therefore, any
failure by the Commission to strictly apply the rules of evidence is not error in and of itself.
C.

Even If The Commission Is Bound By The Rules Of Evidence, Its Exclusion Of The
Defense Of Retaliatory Discharge Was Appropriate
Even if the rules of evidence were strictly applicable to the Commission, its exclusion of

evidence of retaliatory discharge was appropriate. Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence clearly
provides for the exclusion of irrelevant evidence as inadmissible. As discussed above, the only
two issues before the Commission were whether Officer Lucas had been untruthful and whether
his actions justified termination. Any evidence beyond those two inquiries was immaterial to the
review conducted by the Commission. In other words, the issue before the Commission wasn't
whether someone was "out to get him" and conducted the investigation in a manner to do so, but
whether Officer Lucas lied during the internal affairs investigation and at the pre-termination
hearing. As a result, the Commission properly excluded evidence related to the investigation as
irrelevant to the inquiry.
Additionally, on October 14, 1996, the Commission held a motion in limine hearing to
determine whether the defense of retaliatory discharge should be admitted. The Commission
actually received evidence, heard oral argument, and determined that the evidence proffered by
Officer Lucas was immaterial and irrelevant to the Commission's proceedings. (R. 162-163). In
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a nutshell, the evidence received by the Commission proved that the allegation of retaliatory
discharge was untenable because neither Chief Killian nor Lieutenant Pete Fondaco knew that
Officer Lucas was one of the complainants who instigated the 1994 Attorney General's
investigation. (R. 134-135,136-137, 160-161). The Commission's determination that the
evidence was irrelevant was based upon motions and memorandum of the parties, on affidavits of
the material witnesses on the issue, and on argument of counsel at the motion in limine hearing.
Therefore, the Commission properly determined that any proffered evidence on retaliatory
discharge was irrelevant and would serve only to convolute the proceedings.
Officer Lucas argues further that State v. Patterson, 656 P.2d 438 (Utah 1982) should
require reversal where the Commission entered no findings of fact or conclusions of law in
support of its motion in limine. On its face, it is highly questionable whether findings on an
evidentiary ruling are required of an administrative entity. Of more import to the present case,
however, is the holding of the Patterson court that, in light of the other evidence presented, the
failure to enter findings and conclusions was harmless error. Patterson at 439-440.
D.

Even If The Evidence Was Improperly Excluded, Officer Lucas Has Failed To Make
A Showing Of Harmful Error
"An erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence does not constitute reversible error

unless the error is harmful." Cal Wadsworth Construction v. City of St George, 898 P.2d 1372,
1378 (Utah 1995). To require reversal, the "likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently
high to undermine confidence in the [outcome]." Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 442 (Utah
1996). Reversal of an evidentiary error is necessary only "where, after review of all the evidence
presented ... it appears that 'absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that a different result
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would have been reached.'" Utah Dept of Transportation v. 6200 South Associates, 872 P.2d
462, 465 (Utah App. 1994). Otherwise, the error is deemed to be harmless. E.g., Harline at 442.
Officer Lucas has failed to show and is unable to show that, had the evidence of retaliation
been admitted, the Commission would have reversed the termination of Officer Lucas. In order to
make such a showing, Officer Lucas would need to show this Court that the Commission could
find no facts to support the conclusions reached by Chief Killian that Officer Lucas had been
untruthful and that termination was warranted. However, Officer Lucas has not made such a
showing. There is more than enough evidence in the record to support the determinations that
Officer Lucas was untruthful and that termination was appropriate. To that end, the evidence of
retaliation was properly excluded.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions entered by the Commission are the best evidence as
to (1) what the scope of the inquiry was, (2) what the Commission considered, and (3) whether
the outcome would have been different had the excluded evidence been admitted. Some excerpts
illustrate these points:
7. At the hearing, Officer Lucas testified that he did not unholster
his weapon, but that he unsnapped it twice.

9. The Commissionfindsthat Officer Lucas' statements regarding
the holstering and unholstering of his weapon to be inconsistent and
not credible. Officer Lucas has alternatively testified that he
thought Spegar may have had sharp objects in his pocket, such as
drug paraphernalia and/or that he had a weapon in his crotch area.
The Commission does notfindthis testimony credible given the
testimony of Officer Snow that none of the suspects appeared to be
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and that Spegar had been,
at all times, cooperative during the course of the apprehension and
interrogation and had made no threatening gestures. Officer Lucas
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also had ample opportunity to satisfy himself that the suspect did
not have a weapon. The Commission does not find credible Officer
Lucas' testimony that he cannot remember whether his weapon was
holstered or unholstered. Indeed, he testified in great detail about
his recollection of the weapon and did not indicate during the
course of his testimony that he could not remember what occurred
in the interrogation room. Additionally, Officer Lucas testified that
when he apprehended Spegar at the scene of the crime and was
concerned that Spegar might have a weapon, he drew down and
yelled at him words to the effect that he would "blow his brains
out" if he didn't stop. Thus, it would have been perfectly believable
had Officer Lucas in the station room believed that Spegar was
going for a weapon to have done the same thing. Clearly, Officer
Lucas' statements regarding what occurred in the interrogation
room and the details of the incident offered by Officer Lucas
changed substantially in subsequent interviews from the statement
initially given to Lieutenant Fondaco. Under these circumstances,
the Commission finds that Chief Killian was reasonable in
interpreting Officer Lucas' statements as inconsistent and
untruthful.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions (R. 220-222).
In the context of the Commission hearing, it is important to know that Officer Lucas'
statements made to Lt. Fondaco during the investigation and to Chief Killian during the pretermination hearing were not simply characterizations by those men. The interview with Lt.
Fondaco was taped and a transcript prepared. (R. 302-310). Likewise, the pre-termination
hearing was taped and transcribed. (R. 365-382). In other words, the untruthful statements of
Officer Lucas were independently verifiable by the Commission. The Commission did not have to
rely solely upon the testimony of Lt. Fondaco or Chief Killian. Thus, evidence as to retaliatory
motive was clearly irrelevant to the issue of whether the Commission believed untruthful
statements had been made.
Officer Lucas has failed to demonstrate any likelihood that the Commission would have
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reached a different conclusion had it admitted and considered the evidence of retaliation. The
Commission'sfindingsand conclusions clearly indicate that it based its decision on the various
statements made by Officer Lucas and its feeling that his statements were not credible or reliable.
Had the Commission admitted the evidence of retaliatory motive, there is no indication that the
outcome would have been different. As a result, any error in excluding that evidence is harmless
and does not justify reversal.
POINT III
THERE IS SUFFICIENT MATERIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO
SUPPORT THE COMMISSION'S DECISION TO UPHOLD CHIEF
KILLIAN'S CONCLUSION THAT OFFICER LUCAS HAD BEEN
UNTRUTHFUL
The "substantial evidence" standard for judicial review of administrative actions does not
deal with the quantity of evidence. Rather, "substantial evidence is 'that quantum and quality of
relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion."
Harken v. Board of Oil Gas and Minerals, 920 P.2d 1176,1180 (Utah 1996). There is sufficient
relevant evidence in the record before the Commission to convince a reasonable mind to support
the Commission's conclusion.
The key to evaluation of this issue is the materiality of the facts reviewed by the
Commission and the facts argued by Officer Lucas. At the risk of redundancy, it is important to
point out that only facts related to the truthfulness of Officer Lucas' various statements are
material for purposes of determining the sufficiency of the evidence. Officer Lucas' marshaling of
the evidence (Brief of Petitioner 14-19) includes some facts which are not material to this ultimate
issue. In addition, much of his statement of evidence which he believes makes the Commission's
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findings unreasonable is based on the credibility of Mr. Spegar, testimony of Mr. Garcia, who was
arrested with Mr. Spegar, and other evidence related to the arrest and processing of Mr. Spegar.
While the circumstances surrounding Officer Lucas' handling of Mr. Spegar may have
precipitated the internal affairs investigation, those facts and the investigation itself are material to
the Commission's inquiry only to the extent of what Officer Lucas said during the investigation
and whether those statements were untruthful.
The following statements are just some of the material facts that constitute substantial
evidence upon which the Commission made its determination. Officer Chris Snow came forward
in a supplemental case report with information indicating that he observed Officer Lucas standing
at Martin Spegar's side with his service revolver drawn during a search at the Murray City Police
Department. (R. 300). Upon initial questioning about the event by Lieutenant Fondaco, Officer
Lucas unequivocally denied ever pulling his weaponfromhis holster. (R. 306). Officer Lucas
stated he only "unsnapped" his gun and denied pointing the weapon at Mr. Spegar's head. (R.
306). Later, Officer Lucas told Vern Peterson during a polygraph interview that his weapon "was
unsnapped, [his] hand was on it, and it was obviously two or three inches outside the leather. It
was pointed down...." Officer Lucas then stated several times to Vern Peterson that he "didn't
know" whether he pulled his weapon or not. (R. 398). Officer Lucas' statements at the pretermination hearing were also inconsistent. He stated that "[m]y hand goes for my weapon. I
unsnap it, and it starts to come out" and that he didn't "know exactly where [his] gun was." (R.
366). Then Officer Lucas states "I'm leaning forward, pushing this guy awayfromme, so I'm
leaning away, and my gun is in and out, sliding up and down. It could have been beside me, it
could have been pointing at the floor." (R. 367). Officer Lucas goes on to say "my weapon was
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either in my holsterfloatingin and out as I was pushing the guy away or to the side." (R. 375).
Looking only at those material facts and others listed in the Commission's Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 219- 222) as determinablefromreliable sources including taped
interviews and what Officer Lucas said at the hearing, the Commission concluded that Officer
Lucas' statements were not credible and that Chief Killian properly deemed them to be untruthful.
(R. 220-222). There are no material facts which lead to any different conclusion.
Given the clearly erroneous standard and the great deference given to the Commission's
findings of fact, this Court should conclude that the Commission acted within its discretion and
did not abuse that discretion. There is clearly substantial evidence on which the Commission
could reach its findings. Thosefindingsare not "clearly against the logic and effect" of the
material facts before the Commission. The factual findings of the Commission should, therefore,
be affirmed.
POINT IV
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
TERMINATION OF A POLICE OFFICER WAS AN APPROPRIATE
DISCIPLINARY ACTION FOR UNTRUTHFULNESS
Department policy requires honesty in general and in internal affairs investigations in
particular. For example, department policies provide that an officer may be discharged for
untruthfulness in an internal affairs investigation. Murray City Police Department Policies and
Procedures § 555(IX)(A) (R. 57). Whether employment termination is an appropriate disciplinary
action for untruthfulness is determined by the status of the employee. Perhaps termination would
have been too severe an action for the routine public employee. However, police officers are held
to a higher standard of conduct than other public employees, especially in matters involving
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honesty. E.g., In re Discharge of Jones. See also Clearfield City v. Dept. of Employment
Security, 663 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983) (police officer who committed an illegal act then lied about it
was properly terminated); Utah Dept. of Corrections v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439, 446 (Utah App.
1991) (discharge of prison guard was not excessive where "the position requires high morals,
control and discipline."); Ackerman v. California State Personnel Board, 193 Cal.Rptr 190, 192
(1983) (officer's action "would probably warrant some form of punishment less than dismissal if
he was not a police officer."
A police officer's dishonesty is of great concern. See Hamilton v. City of Mesa, 916 P.2d
1136, 1145 (Ariz. App. 1995) (termination of police department employee for untruthfulness was
not disproportionate). Untruthful statements given by a police officer during an internal
investigation clearly merit termination. Bell v. Cosgrove, 633 N.Y.S.2d 183 (AD 1995)
(upholding dismissal of officer for infractions including "knowingly giving false information"
during internal affairs investigation); Justice v. City ofCasa Grande, 567 P.2d 1195 (Ariz. App.
1977) (discharge for failing to tell the truth during a departmental investigation). Further, the
determination that an untruthful officer is not trustworthy to serve as a police officer belongs to
police personnel and is beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Gentry v. City of Helena, 773 P.2d
309, 315 (Mont. 1989).
In its conclusions, the Commission demonstrated that it recognized (1) the seriousness of
termination for untruthfulness and (2) the requirement that the police department be able to rely
on the basic honesty of its officers.
4. Trust and honesty are essential to the good order and discipline
of a police force.
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5. While discharge, under the circumstances of this case, is a harsh
punishment, the Police Chief must have complete confidence in the
honesty and integrity of his officers and the Commissionfindsthat
it is not an abuse of his discretionary powers to have terminated
Officer Lucas' employment for reasons of dishonesty.
(R. 222-23).
Officer Lucas argues that there was no credible evidence before the Commission that he
intended to deceive. The focus of inquiry, however, is not whether deceptive intent existed, but
whether Officer Lucas made, intentionally or unintentionally, untruthful statements or was less
than candid with his superior officers during the internal affairs investigation and at the pretermination hearing. The implications of having a police officer on the force who is unable to
remember facts and therefore makes unreliable or untruthful statements, both for the police
department and for the public at large, rangefromtroubling tofrightening.It is a fundamental
requirement in our society that police officials, the courts, and the public are able to believe police
officers whose testimony may be at odds with those of an arrestee or innocent bystanders. Officer
Lucas' subjective intent and the issue of whether Officer Lucas intended to deceive his superior
officers are irrelevant to the inquiries of whether he actually made those inconsistent statements
and whether his termination therefor was appropriate.
The requirement for honesty in police officers clearly sets a higher standard for Officer
Lucas than would be required of a city garbage collector or secretary. The policy of progressive
discipline may be appropriate in the case of the latter, but because honesty is fundamentally
expected and required of police officers, it is appropriate to impose a more severe sanction for
failure to meet the higher standard.
The Commission properly considered the seriousness of termination and appropriately
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found it to have been properly invoked under the circumstances of this case. This decision by the
Commission clearly falls within its "arena of discretion." There is no evidence of abuse of this
discretion. Therefore, the Court should affirm the Commission decision.
POINT V
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY EXCLUDED MR. SPEGAR'S TAPED
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION AND EVEN IF THE EVIDENCE
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADMITTED, FAILURE TO DO SO WAS
HARMLESS ERROR
A.

The Commission Properly Excluded The Audio Tape Of Mr. Spegar's Polygraph
Examination Because Officer Lucas Did Not Lay Proper Foundation
The requirement to establish foundation for admission of evidence is axiomatic. Rule 901,

Utah R. Evid. Officer Lucas' counsel attempted to use the tape recording of Mr. Spegar's
polygraph examination for purposes of impeaching his testimony. As authentication, he wished to
play a portion of the tape for Mr. Spegar to identify his voice. Upon being denied that
opportunity, counsel presented no legal argument to support his use of Mr. Spegar's
authentication as foundation for admitting the evidence. Only now does Mr. Lucas argue that the
Council's determination not to play the tape improperly precluded his authentication of the
evidence. This argument should be disregarded because it is raised for the first time on appeal.
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 751 (Utah 1996) (failure to make an argument at
the administrative proceeding precludes raising it on review); Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Service
Commission 917 P.2d 1082, 1085, n.4 (Utah 1996) (court would not address issue raised for first
time on appeal).
It is also significant that the Commission expected that authentication would be made by
another means. The portion of the transcript which Mr. Lucas omittedfromhis argument (Brief
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of Petitioner, p. 31) is directly on point.
Mr. Ferguson: I think you've got to have the right witness here to
lay the foundation.
Mr. Benevento: Can I at least have it subject to recall, then? I think
I'm done with this witness.
Mr. Ferguson: Can't Vern Peterson testify that it's him on the tape?
Mr. Benevento: If he's going to say that that's sufficient
foundation, that's fine.
Mr. Ferguson: He's there, he has personal knowledge as to who
was in the room.
Mr. Benevento: All right.
(R. 575).
Officer Lucas' counsel did not avail himself of the alternative, acceptable means of
providing foundation for the admission of the tape recording. Nor did he argue why Mr. Spegar
should be permitted to authenticate the tape. By his actions, he waived any objections to the
exclusion of this evidence.
B.

Even If The Audio Tape Should Have Been Admitted, The Error Was Harmless
Even if the tape recording were improperly excluded, Officer Lucas has failed to

demonstrate that this error was not harmless. First, the transcript of Mr. Spegar's polygraph
interview was already entered into evidence as Exhibit 21. (R. 420-448). Officer Lucas could
have impeached Mr. Spegar's testimony with this transcript which had already been introduced
and needed no additional foundation, but he failed to do so. Second, as with other evidence
which Officer Lucas wished to present, this evidence was, at best, tangential to the core issue of
whether Officer Lucas was untruthful in his statements during the investigation and at the pre24

termination hearing. To that end, the Commission could entirely exclude the testimony of Mr.
Spegar, with or without impeachment, and still conclude that the claims of untruthfulness were
supported by the evidence. In fact, a reading of the Commission's findings show that the
members relied on other evidence to establish their factual findings.
There is no indication that, had the tape recording been admitted and used to impeach Mr.
Spegar, the outcome of the hearing would have been different. As a result, any error in failing to
admit the tape recording was clearly harmless error and does not require judicial reversal.
POINT VI
THE COMMISSION APPROPRIATELY RETAINED AND UTILIZED
THE SERVICES OF INDEPENDENT LEGAL COUNSEL AND EVEN IF
THE EXTENT OF THE COUNSEL'S INVOLVEMENT WERE
INAPPROPRIATE, THE ERROR IS HARMLESS
Officer Lucas' argument that it was beyond the authority of the Commission to retain and
use the services of independent legal counsel is incongruent with his argument that the
Commission be bound to apply rules of evidence, which the Commission members are not trained
or experienced in applying. It is clear that when the Commission deals with rulings on
admissibility, the scope of its review and issues of law, it needs to have legal advice. The only
other source of legal advice would be the city attorney or his staff. It is obviously inappropriate
for the Commission to rely on the legal advice of counsel who are advocating a position before
the Commission. The need for independent legal advice is apparent and the authority to obtain
that advice may reasonably be inferred from the statutes and regulations governing the
Commission.
Even if the Commission's use of independent legal counsel in this matter were
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inappropriate, there is still no basis for reversal of the Commission's decision. First, Officer Lucas
failed to object at the hearing to the involvement of the independent counsel in a way sufficient to
preserve the issue for appeal. Failure to register his objections before the Commission amounted
to a waiver by Officer Lucas of that issue. See Badger and Harmon supra. Second, the material
facts were considered and weighed by the Commission members. The Commission made its
determination mostlyfromthe compiled factual record and in partfromtestimony at the hearing.
Officer Lucas has presented no argument or factual basis for the conclusion that the outcome of
the Commission's inquiry would have been different had the Commission's counsel not taken an
active part. As with other tangential issues argued by Officer Lucas, any error on the part of the
Commission with respect to the retention and use of independent legal counsel is harmless error
which requires no judicial reversal.
POINT VII
THE CITY'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ITS INTERNAL
AFFAIRS RULES WAS IMMATERIAL TO THE BASIS FOR OFFICER
LUCAS' TERMINATION AND TO THE COMMISSION'S
AFFIRMATION OF THAT TERMINATION
A.

The Termination Of Officer Lucas Was Not The Result Of The Internal Affairs
Investigation
Once again, it is important to emphasize that Officer Lucas was not terminated for his

conduct giving rise to the internal affairs investigation. Officer Lucas was terminated for
untruthfulness, both in the internal affairs investigation and in the pre-termination hearing. His
termination was not based upon the conclusions derivedfromthe internal affairs investigation of
his inappropriate conduct during a search of Martin Spegar. As a result, any procedural defects in
the internal affairs investigation are immaterial to the Commission's determination pursuant to §
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10-3-1012.
Officer Lucas argues that he was never notified that the investigation had changed to one
of dishonesty. (Brief of Petitioner, p. 36). However, the focus of the internal affairs investigation
never changed from investigating whether or not Officer Lucas' used excessive force during a
search of Martin Spegar, and the results of that affairs investigation were inconclusive. By
making the argument that the focus of the investigation changed, Officer Lucas implies that he
was entitled to some type of internal affairs investigation prior to his dismissal for dishonesty. To
the contrary, an internal affairs investigation is only required where a complaint has been made
against an officer, generally by a member of the public. Although the termination was based in
part upon Officer Lucas' untruthfulness during the internal affairs investigation, his termination
was not based upon the subject of the investigation. There was never a separate investigation of
the untruthfulness violation of city policy; nor was one required. Therefore, any failure by the
City to comply with its internal affairs procedures and policies is immaterial to whether the
termination of Officer Lucas was appropriate.
B.

There Is No Basis For A Due Process Claim
Officer Lucas implies that he was deprived of due process, but does not identify the

process to which he claims entitlement. He did, however, receive due process by way of his pretermination hearing. His argument that his termination should be reversed because the city
allegedly failed to strictly follow its procedure with respect to the original investigation are
without merit and clearly do not justify reversal.
CONCLUSION
The Commission properly conducted its inquiry within the parameters defined by statute.
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It properly excluded issues and evidence which were beyond the scope of its review, immaterial to
its determinations, and for which no proper foundation had been laid. The Commission also
properly exercised its discretion in determining that there was sufficient evidence and justification
for upholding Chief Killian's termination of Officer Lucas.
Given the narrow nature of the statutorily prescribed judicial review and the great
deference afforded to the Commission while acting within its discretion, this Court should affirm
the determination of the Commission.

DATED this 21st day of April, 1997.

By_

LXuZ^
-H. Craig Hall
Murray City Attorney
5025 South State Street
Murray, Utah 84157-0520
(801) 264-2640
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